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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BRIGHT, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. 
 
Following a warrantless search of their home and 
business, Michael and Ann Showers brought this civil 
rights action against Wildlife Conservation Officer Steven 
Spangler and his co-defendants -- all officers or officials of 
the Pennsylvania Game Commission. The District Court 
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants after 
finding them entitled to qualified immunity. Because we 
conclude, however, that an objectively reasonable law 
enforcement officer in Spangler's position would know that 
searches such as the one made in this case may only be 
carried out under a properly executed warrant, summary 
judgment based on qualified immunity was improvidently 
granted in his favor. We therefore reverse the District 
Court's ruling as to Officer Spangler, although we affirm in 
all other respects. 
 
II. 
 
We review questions of qualified immunity and summary 
judgment de novo and consider the evidence presented to 
the District Court in a light most favorable to the non- 
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moving party. See Assaf v. Fields, No. 98-7153, 1999 WL 
312324, at *4 (3d Cir. May 19, 1999). After review, the 
following facts appear from the developed record. 
 
Michael Showers ("Showers") is a licensed taxidermist. In 
the spring of 1992, Showers owned and operated Bear 
Mountain Taxidermy ("Bear Mountain") in the small town of 
Arendtsville, near Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. Bear Mountain 
was comprised of three buildings -- including a showroom, 
studio, and preparation facility -- all of which were co- 
located on a one-acre parcel of land next to Showers's 
separate, personal residence. 
 
Taxidermists practice their trade under special permits 
issued by the Pennsylvania Game Commission 
("Commission"). Language on the face of the permit requires 
strict compliance with all state and federal game laws, 
including 34 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 2907 ("Inspection 
Statute") which states that: 
 
        Each permit holder shall keep accurate records of all 
       transactions carried out under authority of the permit 
       issued and any other information required by the 
       director. The records must be kept for a period of three 
       years and shall be open to inspection by any officer of 
       the commission during normal business hours and 
       shall be the basis of any reports required by the 
       commission. 
 
A corresponding regulation promulgated by the Commission 
requires that: 
 
        A holder of a permit shall keep a record of 
       transactions on a form provided by the Commission in 
       accordance with the instructions provided. The record, 
       together with the premises, shall be open to inspection 
       upon demand of an officer of the Commission. 
 
58 Pa. Code S 147.1(b)(1993) ("Inspection Regulation").1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. As part of this case, the District Court invalidated S 147.1(b) because 
it determined that the Inspection Regulation failed to circumscribe the 
discretion of law enforcement officers with respect to the time, place, 
and 
scope of authorized inspections. See Showers v. Spangler, 957 F. Supp. 
584, 591-92 (M.D.Pa. 1997). Neither the defendants nor the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania contest the District Court's 
determination of this issue. Hence we leave this portion of the District 
Court's order, and its thoughtful analysis, undisturbed. 
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Steven Spangler ("Spangler"), at the time of the events in 
question, was a Wildlife Conservation Officer ("WCO"). He 
was assigned by the Commission to enforce Pennsylvania's 
game laws, and he had primary jurisdiction for taxidermists 
in Adams County, including Arendtsville. 
 
The relationship between Showers, Spangler, and the 
events giving rise to this case, appear to begin as far back 
as March 26, 1992. At that time, Spangler charged one of 
Showers's customers with taking a wild turkey out of 
season. As part of his investigation, Spangler questioned 
Showers and examined Bear Mountain's official records -- 
including those related both to the allegedly illegal turkey 
as well as those related to other animals passing through 
Showers's shop. Showers informed Spangler that he 
understood the turkey to have been taken in-season and 
then frozen for future preparation. 
 
Four days later, on March 30, 1992, Showers found that 
Officer Spangler had entered his business when Showers 
was not there, searched through materials, some in a non- 
public area of the shop, and examined Bear Mountain's log 
book. When confronted, Spangler indicated that he was 
entitled to inspect the business records "anytime he wanted 
to[,] with or without [Mr. Showers's] permission." Affidavit 
of Michael Showers, App. at 137a. 
 
As a result of this incident, Showers sent a letter of 
complaint to defendant Peter Duncan, the Commission's 
Executive Director, on May 8, 1992. In this letter, Showers 
alleged that Spangler was harassing him and conducting 
his duties in an unprofessional manner. See App. at 97a- 
99a. Although it is clear that Showers and Spangler also 
disagreed over fundamental interpretations of the game 
laws, this letter was clearly precipitated by Spangler's 
surreptitious entry into Showers's showroom and 
Spangler's subsequent examination of Showers's records in 
his absence. Id. at 97a-98a. 
 
Although Duncan did not respond to the May 8 letter, 
word of Mr. Showers's complaints apparently filtered back 
to Officer Spangler because he confronted Showers on June 
2, 1992 and expressed his displeasure that Showers had 
not dealt directly with him rather than sending "a letter to 
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Harrisburg." App. at 100a. Spangler appeared at Showers's 
shop and told him, among other things, that: Showers 
should not have "gone over his head"; that he, Spangler, 
was "the law in this jurisdiction"; that "you have to do what 
I say"; and that he would regulate Showers "the way I see 
fit." App. at 137a-138a. In short, he belligerently threatened 
to "check [Showers] out . . . if [he] refused to cooperate" by 
conducting invasive and time-consuming searches of 
Showers's freezers. App. at 101a. In response, Showers told 
Spangler that he would never consent to searches of this 
type and that if Spangler intended to conduct such a 
search he should have a warrant. According to Showers, 
Spangler went on to tell Showers, "you'd well do as you're 
told or I will put you out of business period, point blank." 
Deposition of Michael Showers, Dist. Ct. Doc. 24, Vol. I at 
155. 
 
On August 14, 1992, Showers wrote a second letter of 
complaint, this time to Regional Director David Sloan. See 
App. at 100a-103a. This letter described the June 2 
confrontation and indicated that Spangler was continuing 
to harass and threaten him.2 
 
In response to the letter of August 14, a meeting was 
held between Showers, Spangler, and one of Spangler's 
superiors, defendant Ron Clouser. At that meeting, Mr. 
Clouser admitted the impropriety of Spangler's threats. He 
acknowledged that random searches were not the policy of 
the Commission and that Spangler had "personal problems" 
that were influencing his job performance. App. at 138a. 
 
After seven months in which no contact apparently 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Showers's allegations of continued harassment in the summer of 1992 
have their genesis in testimony he gave after being subpoenaed in the 
prosecution of the sportsman that Spangler had previously accused of 
taking a wild turkey out of season. The sportsman was acquitted after 
Showers testified that the turkey's feathers showed damage consistent 
with a bird that had been long frozen, thus corroborating the 
sportsman's defense that he had in fact taken the turkey in season and 
then froze it for a period of time prior to mounting it. With his 
prosecution of the sportsman scuttled, Spangler apparently became 
angry "because [Showers] did not testify the way [Spangler] wanted." 
App. at 136a. 
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occurred between Showers and Spangler, Spangler and 
another WCO attended a local auction on March 26, 1993. 
There they found a "wolf-caribou mount" owned by Showers.3 
Because the wolf is an endangered species, in order to buy, 
sell, or possess such a carcass, certain paperwork must be 
in order and, by Commission practice and policy, must 
include either a permit issued by the Commission or a CITES4 
permit in lieu thereof. 
 
On March 31, 1993, Spangler met with Showers to review 
Bear Mountain's records with respect to the wolf-caribou 
mount and other items sold at the auction. Showers 
showed Spangler his CITES permit, which authorized 
export of the wolf from Canada, as well as his purchase 
records for the wolf. 
 
Determined to take enforcement action against Showers, 
despite the fact that his possession of the wolf appeared to 
be legal, Spangler contacted defendant James Beard, head 
of the Commission's Special Investigations Unit, in an 
attempt to initiate an undercover operation targeting 
Showers for criminal prosecution. Mr. Beard declined to 
start such a probe because, in his view, the evidence 
collected by Spangler did not suggest criminal wrongdoing. 
App. at 162a. 
 
Nevertheless, on April 12, 1993, Spangler obtained a 
search warrant for the Showers's premises and drew up an 
elaborate four-page plan for "Operation U-Haul." Both steps 
were highly unusual. Search warrants were not a regular 
part of the inspection routine.5 Nor were detailed operation 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. This mount is a large artistic representation of the predator-prey 
relationship in which a full-sized, stuffed wolf appears to be attacking a 
full-sized, stuffed caribou. 
 
4. CITES is the Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species, a multi-party international treaty which governs national 
obligations with respect to endangered species and the use of products 
related thereto. 
 
5. With respect to search warrants, Officer Spangler was asked at his 
deposition: 
 
        Q: When you normally did an inspection, would you get a search 
       warrant prior to the inspection? 
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plans.6 
 
On the morning of April 13, 1993, eight armed and 
uniformed Commission officers descended on the Showers's 
business and residence.7 Citing authority to conduct an 
administrative inspection under statute and regulation, 
neither Spangler nor any other officer produced, served, or 
mentioned the search warrant. At no time did Showers 
affirmatively consent to the search, nor was he advised by 
the officers of his right to refuse. 
 
Despite Showers's complaints of illegality, the search 
proceeded. Officers questioned Showers about a variety of 
animals in his shop. Over a period of several hours, 
Spangler and the other officers searched the showroom, 
studio, and freezers located in the preparation areas of the 
business. An officer stayed with Showers during the entire 
period of the search. At one point, Officer Spangler became 
so hostile and belligerent toward Showers that other officers 
removed him from the shop in order to "calm him down." 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
        A: No, sir. 
 
        Q: Why did you do it in this case? 
 
        A: Because Mr. Showers had told me -- told me and put in one 
       of those letters of complaint that he was not going to allow a 
search 
       of his freezers. 
 
Deposition of Steven A. Spangler, Dist. Ct. Doc. 25 at 166. 
 
6. With respect to operation plans, Officer Spangler was asked: 
 
        Q: In how many other cases have you made up a detailed plan 
       like that for the purpose of investigation or a search? 
 
        A: This is the most detailed. I don't recall having done that 
       before. 
 
       . . . . 
 
       This I think may have been the only one . . . . 
 
Deposition of Steven A. Spangler, Dist. Ct. Doc. 25 at 180. 
 
7. Participants in the raid, in addition to Officer Spangler, were co- 
defendants Haynes, Houghton, and Smith (all WCOs) and Deputy WCO 
Kessel. Also present but not named in this suit were Deputy WCOs 
Cluck, Herring, and Shilling. 
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Deposition of Michael Showers, Dist. Ct. Doc. 24, Vol. I at 
89. 
 
After completing the search of Bear Mountain's business 
premises, Spangler ordered Showers to show him the 
freezer located in the basement of the Showers's home. Id. 
at 107. Over Showers's protests that nothing business 
related was contained therein, Spangler searched the 
home's freezer and seized some personal, non-business 
items. 
 
In the aftermath of the search, Spangler charged Showers 
with a number of criminal violations. All of these charges 
were subsequently withdrawn by the Commission after 
Spangler's superiors intervened. 
 
In addition to the charges stemming from the raid itself, 
on May 19, 1993, Showers was served with a criminal 
complaint with respect to the wolf-caribou mount-- the 
same mount for which Spangler had previously seen proof 
of legality. On the same day, Officer Spangler publicly 
"tagged" the mount at a sporting goods shop where it was 
being used as an advertisement for Bear Mountain 
Taxidermy.8 
 
On June 3, 1993, Showers and his attorney met with Mr. 
Beard and other ranking members of the Commission. At 
that meeting, the Commission officers acknowledged that 
Showers legally possessed the wolf-caribou mount-- as 
demonstrated to Officer Spangler on March 31-- and the 
criminal charges were withdrawn the next day. Despite that 
fact however, and despite repeated requests to do so, 
Spangler did not remove the tag from the wolf-caribou 
mount until August 19, 1993, more than two months later. 
 
Showers brought suit within the applicable statute of 
limitations under 42 U.S.C. S 1983. Asserting violations of 
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and similar 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Tagging, in this context, means that Spangler placed a written notice 
of seizure on the mount itself -- a notice which falsely broadcast that 
the 
item so tagged was possessed illegally. Spangler also ordered the shop 
owner not to move the mount under any circumstances. Thus, the 
tagged mount was prominently displayed in a shop frequented by the 
very sportsmen who are also the clients of professional taxidermists. 
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sections of the Pennsylvania State Constitution, Showers 
also claimed damages in the form of lost business, damage 
to his professional reputation, and physical injuries from 
stress-related disease. The District Court granted summary 
judgment in favor of all defendants on most of Showers's 
claims, with the sole exception of a claim against Spangler 
related to the tagging of the wolf-caribou mount which the 
court allowed to proceed. Before reaching its decision to 
grant summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the 
bulk of Showers's claims, the court ruled unconstitutional 
the regulation giving Commission officers the power to 
conduct inspections. See Showers v. Spangler, 957 F. Supp. 
584, 591-92 (M.D.Pa. 1997). The court also noted that the 
facts supported an inference that Spangler's search was 
merely a pretext for gathering criminal evidence. Id. 
 
Nevertheless, the District Court granted the defendants, 
including Officer Spangler, qualified immunity from suit on 
the basis that the "pretext doctrine" was not "clearly 
established" at the time the search was conducted on April 
13, 1993. See id. at 593.9 
 
The defendants subsequently took an interlocutory 
appeal from the court's denial of summary judgment on the 
mount-related claims. We dismissed that appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction. The parties then returned to the District Court 
and stipulated to the voluntary dismissal of the mount- 
related claims which, following entry of the court'sfinal 
order on February 18, 1998, permitted this timely appeal 
on the claims for which summary judgment had been 
previously granted. 
 
III. 
 
The only issue now before us is the propriety of the 
District Court's ruling which granted qualified immunity to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The pretext doctrine describes that aspect of the law which recognizes 
that an administrative inspection may not be used as a pretext to gather 
evidence as part of what is in fact a criminal investigation. See United 
States v. Johnson, 994 F.2d 740, 742 (10th Cir. 1993). See also New 
York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 716 n.27 (1987). We do not rely on this 
doctrine for our own decision, however. 
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Spangler, and his co-defendants. "[G]overnment officials 
performing discretionary functions generally are granted a 
qualified immunity and are `shielded from liability for civil 
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly 
established statutory or constitutional  rights of which a 
reasonable person would have known.' " Wilson v. Layne, 
No. 98-83, 1999 WL 320817, at *8 (May 24, 1999) (quoting 
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)) (emphasis 
added). 
 
When addressing qualified immunity claims, we proceed 
in two steps. See Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 826 (3rd 
Cir. 1997). First, we must ask whether the conduct alleged 
by the plaintiff violated a clearly established principle of 
constitutional or statutory law. See Johnson v. Horn, 150 
F.3d 276, 286 (3rd Cir. 1998). If so, then we go on to ask 
whether the unlawfulness of the action would have been 
apparent to an objectively reasonable official. Id. Thus, an 
officer's subjective intent in carrying out the challenged 
action -- whether malicious or benevolent -- is immaterial 
to the resolution of questions concerning qualified 
immunity. Instead, "whether an official protected by 
qualified immunity may be held personally liable for an 
allegedly unlawful official action generally turns on the 
`objective legal reasonableness' of the action, assessed in 
light of the legal rules that were `clearly established' at the 
time it was taken." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 
639 (1987) (citation omitted). 
 
At the first step then, in order to determine that a legal 
right was clearly established at the time of the alleged 
violation, the right must be "defined at the appropriate level 
of specificity", id. at 641, because, as the Supreme Court 
recently reaffirmed, "what `clearly established' means . . . 
depends largely `upon the level of generality at which the 
relevant legal rule' is to be established." Wilson, No. 98-83, 
1999 WL 320817, at *8 (May 24, 1999) (quoting Anderson, 
483 U.S. at 639). 
 
In this case, we believe the appropriate question is the 
objective inquiry of whether, on April 13, 1993, a 
reasonable officer would have known that his 
administrative powers were circumscribed by statute and 
constitutional requirements to the extent that he could not 
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conduct a search for evidence of criminal wrongdoing 
without a warrant. We have no difficulty concluding that a 
reasonable officer would have so known. 
 
The Fourth Amendment is designed to protect liberty, 
privacy, and possessory interests against arbitrary 
intrusion by the government. See Soldal v. Cook County, 
506 U.S. 56, 62-63 (1992). It is therefore axiomatic that 
Fourth Amendment protections require law enforcement 
officers to procure and execute a warrant before conducting 
a search, subject only to a few well recognized exceptions. 
In this case, one of the well recognized exceptions to the 
warrant requirement -- administrative inspections 
pursuant to regulatory regimes -- may in fact be implicated 
if taxidermy is recognized as a highly regulated business.10 
 
Even so, this exception for administrative searches is 
extremely limited. When the Supreme Court considered and 
upheld the legality of a warrantless administrative search of 
an auto salvage yard in New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 
(1987), the Court noted that there was "no reason to believe 
that the instant inspection was actually a `pretext' for 
obtaining evidence of respondent's violation of the penal 
laws." Id. at 717 n.27. Such comment strongly implies that 
"pretext" on the part of those conducting an otherwise 
proper administrative search will render it unconstitutional. 
This conclusion is not novel for it has made its way into 
established hornbook law. See David Rudstein, et al., 
Criminal Constitutional Law P 3.06[3][d] (1998). 
 
Spangler correctly points out that the Court's footnote in 
Burger is not strictly part of its holding, and that this so- 
called "pretext doctrine" was not clearly established in 1993 
because no court in the Third Circuit had previously 
considered or recognized it. Nevertheless, the Burger 
decision otherwise supports reversal. 
 
Whatever the merits of permitting even limited searches 
pursuant to administrative regimes, the power to conduct 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. A warrant is generally not required for searches of businesses in 
highly regulated industries. See, e.g. Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United 
States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (liquor); and United States v. Biswell, 406 
U.S. 311 (1972) (guns). 
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them is not more extensive than the actual authority vested 
in the officers by the administrative regime itself. 
 
In this instance, the text of the Inspection Statute, on 
which Spangler relies, makes three demands of taxidermy 
permittees: (1) they must "keep accurate records" and 
"other information" as required; (2) these records must be 
"kept for a period of three years"; and (3) these records 
shall be "open to inspection by any officer of the 
commission." In turn, from these same provisions, an 
officer of the Commission is vested with the power to 
inspect said same records and information. We see nothing 
in the Inspection Statute that may be read to confer a 
general search power. Indeed, all of the obligations and 
rights created by the statute are tied to the duty to keep 
and ability to inspect a permittee's records. 
 
The Inspection Regulation -- upon which Spangler was 
also entitled to rely at the time of the search, despite its 
constitutional infirmities -- is worded more broadly but is 
also ultimately tied to the records kept under the permit. 
The Inspection Regulation also requires permittees to "keep 
a record" of transactions, but states that "[t]he record, 
together with the premises, shall be open to inspection 
upon demand . . . ." Thus, the Inspection Regulation seems 
to include an additional aspect relating to premises not 
provided by statute. But even broadly construed, such 
language is insufficient to grant officers of the Commission 
the type of sweeping search power Spangler claims. At best 
the Inspection Regulation conferred a limited power to 
search the transaction records of permittees-- albeit under 
all too generous terms of time (on demand) and place (the 
premises). 
 
In other words, even when we consider the administrative 
regime in this case and construe it liberally, we conclude 
that there remained for all objectively reasonable officers a 
discernable difference between an inspection of records, for 
which no warrant was required, and a search for which a 
warrant was always required absent consent from the 
person being searched. This interpretation is far from 
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unique and the record as a whole strongly corroborates it 
as the prevailing view.11 
 
The foregoing limitations on an administrative search 
also rest on the specific language of the Supreme Court in 
Burger. The Court justified the search in that case in part 
on the basis that, if those conducting searches operate 
within the powers granted to them by the statutory scheme, 
those being searched "[know] that the inspections to which 
[they are] subject do not constitute discretionary acts by a 
government official but are conducted pursuant to statute." 
Burger, 691 U.S. at 711. The Court went on to add that, 
when the scope of the law is set forth, the statute"places 
the operator on notice as to how to comply with the 
statute." Id. Finally, Burger emphasized that administrative 
searches must be limited by the terms of the statutes which 
authorized them in order "to place appropriate restraints 
upon the discretion of the inspecting officers." Id. Thus, the 
law barring random and extensive administrative searches 
had been clearly established since at least the Burger case 
in 1987. 
 
Here, Spangler designed "Operation U-haul," from its 
conception, as a search outside the statutory authority for 
an administrative inspection -- creating a search for 
criminal physical evidence and not an inspection of a 
taxidermist's records. As the District Court noted, 
Spangler's efforts to plan and conduct an exhaustive search 
of Showers's home and business had all the hallmarks of a 
purely criminal investigation: he focused on possible 
criminal wrongdoing well in advance of the actual search, 
for which he planned extensively and organized a large 
show of force; he applied for a warrant, knowing that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. As but one example, in his deposition testimony, co-defendant Beard 
discussed the general understanding of search and seizure principles 
within the Commission and among its officers, and he noted that such 
a distinction was understood. He said, inter alia, 
 
       [In my answers] I'm trying to keep [a] search separated from an 
       inspection. You know, an inspection is an inspection. A search is a 
       search. When you search, you have a search warrant or you have [ ] 
       consent . . . . 
 
App. at 168a. 
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Showers indicated he would refuse consent, and implying 
that he knew a warrant was in fact required. Yet at the time 
of the search itself, he failed to serve the warrant as 
required by law. These actions violated the clearly 
established parameters of both the Inspection Statute and 
Inspection Regulation upon which he relied for his 
authority. 
 
Thus, a reasonable officer in Spangler's position would 
have known that the actions he undertook in this case were 
not authorized by either the administrative statute or 
regulation then in place. Because the boundaries of his 
inspection authority were, in fact, clearly established -- and 
did not include the use of administrative inspection to 
randomly and extensively search for evidence of crimes -- 
Spangler is not entitled to qualified immunity. His liability, 
if any, for the search of April 13, 1993 is for a jury to 
decide. 
 
Having held that Officer Spangler is not entitled to 
qualified immunity, we must briefly consider his co- 
defendants. Unlike Spangler, each of the other officers and 
officials named in the suit, on these facts, appear to have 
carried out their duties in an objectively reasonable 
manner. Four of the defendants -- Officers Haynes, 
Houghton, Kessel and Smith -- did participate in the illegal 
search. However, all four participated under Spangler's 
direct operational control and the record discloses nothing 
to suggest that any of them knew that Spangler was 
exceeding his authority. As to the remaining four 
defendants -- Supervisors Sloan, Beard, Clouser, and 
Fagan -- nothing on the record suggests that they were 
aware of the search before it took place. While they knew of 
Showers's complaints against Spangler, and might well 
have intervened more forcefully, such tangential 
supervisory involvement cannot support liability and 
certainly does not undercut the District Court's justifiable 
conclusion that they are entitled to qualified immunity. 
 
Accordingly, we reverse the District Court's order 
granting summary judgment in favor of Spangler and 
remand for a jury trial to determine both immunity and 
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liability. As to all other defendants, however, summary 
judgment in their favor is affirmed. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
 
                                15 
